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I. INTRODUCTION

Upon its quiet issuance in the face of the Sturm und Drang
caused by Kelo v. City of New London and its application of the
Public Use Clause to an eminent domain action undertaken for
the purpose of economic development,1 the Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.2 was met with
more restrained but largely appreciative notice by commentators.'
Finally, the Court had simultaneously clarified the normative
justification of the regulatory takings doctrine and restated-even
if it failed to simplify-the doctrine comprehensively both by
narrowing the focus of regulatory takings analysis and by
disentangling it from other constitutional doctrines. Lingle
declared that the Takings Clause affirmatively protects property
owners by awarding them compensation for regulations that
impose the functional equivalent of a condemnation of their
property.4 The regulatory takings doctrine thus differs from the
substantive due process doctrine, which instead reviews the validity
of a regulation and offers as its remedy the invalidation of an
offending government action.' Clearing the underbrush that had
grown in nearly a century of Supreme Court precedent, the Court
appeared to have made the path forward clear.
Viewed four years later, Lingle's narrow project of separating
regulatory takings from substantive due process has been largely
successful. Courts no longer apply stray language from an earlier
decision that Lingle struck from the overstuffed box of key phrases
that compose the takings canon, and they now seem to understand

1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). To view the essence of the Kelo divide, compare the early
entries from two leading and longstanding opponents in the battle between environmental
regulation and property rights: Richard A. Epstein, The Public Use Public Trust & Public
Benefit, 9 GREEN BAG 125 (2006) (asserting, among other things, that Kelo was "illconsidered") and Joseph L. Sax, Kelo: A Case Rightly Decided, 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 365 (2006)
(asserting the opposite).
2. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
3. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Due Process Land Use Claims After.Lingle, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
471, 471 (2007) (praising Lingle for having "greatly clarified" the "constitutional law of
land use regulation"); D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Come Clarity: The Potential Long-Term
Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB.
L. REV. 343, 343 (2006) (praising Lingle's clarity).
4. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
5. Id. at 540-42.
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the distinction between takings and substantive due process
claims.6 Those circuits and jurisdictions that found their precedent
out of compliance with Lingle have performed their own
housekeeping under the Supreme Court's guidance.7 Even when
faced with issues other than the narrow one that Lingle resolved,
lower courts have assiduously quoted Lingle's explanation of
regulatory takings.8 This is no small accomplishment. Regulatory
takings has frequently vexed and perplexed courts, while
commentators and even a Supreme Court justice have accused
lower courts of willfully disregarding the Court's efforts to protect
property owners.9 By stabilizing doctrine and limiting judicial
confusion, Lingle appears to have offered a longed-for peace, an
end to the pitched legal, political, and philosophical battles that
the "takings revolution" and Richard Epstein's landmark book
Takings initiated."
Stability does not equal universal acceptance, of course, and
some commentators have argued that Lingle'is unjust, unwise, and
haphazard," and that the decision fails to clarify either regulatory

6. See infta Part III.
7. See infra Part III-B.
8. See infra Part III-A.
9. See, e.g., Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal.
App. 1997), review granted, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215 (1998), appeal dismissed, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d
412 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1045, 1045 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); David L. Callies,
Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectiveson PropertyRights Have Changedfrom
Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L.
REV. 523, 574 (1999); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme
Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 523, 555-56 (1995).
10. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985). On the role that Epstein played in the development and theory of the
regulatory takings doctrine, see Carol M. Rose, What Federalism Tells Us About Takings
Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681, 1696-97 (2007); Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P.
Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 519-20 (1998).
11. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Poor Relation Once More: the Supreme Court and the
Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 2004-05 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 39, 51-52 (Mark
K. Moller ed., 2005) (characterizing Lingle as "a setback for those interested in reviving
constitutional protection for the rights of property owners," and lamenting that "[i]t is
melancholy to reflect how little progress has been made in clarifying takings jurisprudence
over the past quarter century"); R. S. Radford, Just a Flesh Wound? The Impact of Lingle v.
Chevron on Regulatory Takings Law, 38 URB. LAW. 437, 444-45 (2006) (complaining that
Lingle neglected the significance of the "means-ends" inquiry that the Agins language
established, and that later decisions cited, and suggesting that Lingle itself might be
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takings or substantive due process satisfactorily. 12 Moreover,
Lingle's stability is built upon indeterminacy-specifically, the ad
hoc, multi-factor balancing test enshrined in the first
contemporary
regulatory
takings
decision,
Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City of New York, a decision that has come to
serve as what Justice O'Connor, Lingle's author, had earlier called
the "polestar" of takings jurisprudence. 3 Thus, although stability
might bring peace, it does not establish a mechanical or even
predictable doctrine, given Penn Central's inherent messiness as
well as the
(admittedly lesser)
indeterminacy of the
compartmentalized takings tests that are exempt from the Penn
Centralapproach. 4 But political and philosophical conflicts as well
as doctrinal indeterminacy have always driven regulatory takings
litigation and theory. Given the open-ended, indeterminate
constitutional text on which the doctrine is based, which is silent as
to the definition of "taken" and makes no mention of regulation, 5
as well as the fraught terrains of property rights and land use and
environmental regulation in whose terms opposing parties state
their respective positions, it seems inevitable that any effort to
resolve the issue and stabilize the doctrine will generate disputes.
Any effort will also result in an entangled, complex doctrine, one
unlikely to please those who long for clear analytical distinctions
and bright-line rules.
Buried in Lingle, however, is a loose thread that not only
threatens this stability but also could clutter the conceptual
neatness the Court seemed so confidently to have achieved in the
decision. Penn Central required courts to consider a number of
fuzzy factors in weighing the merits of a regulatory takings claim,
overturned in the future).
12. Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,
2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899, 901.
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)
(characterizing the Penn Centralfactors as "the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory
takings claims that do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules"); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'ConnorJ., concurring) ("Our polestar instead
remains the principles set forth in Penn Central itself .... ).
14. The indeterminacies here both concern whether a particular claim falls within
one of the special categories of takings cases that receive higher scrutiny and, especially in
the Lucas category, whether a traditional common law nuisance exception exists.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[n]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
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among which is the "character of the government action." 16 Always
listed, only occasionally deployed, and left largely undefined, the
"character" factor could look suspiciously like a substantive due
process test. On one hand, it appears to allow a property owner to
challenge the government action's legitimacy; while on the other,
it appears to allow the government to defend itself from a
compensation award by promoting its regulatory action's necessity
and legitimacy." As a result, the very concerns that the Court
attempted. to expunge from regulatory takings analysis in Lingle
could slip back into that analysis via the Penn Centralbalancing test.
Pull hard enough on the "character" factor and the threads of
substantive due process that the Court in Lingle hoped to
disentangle from takings could again become snarled.
Although the conventional trope in takings scholarship
requires the analyst to lament such potential confusion and to
offer a prescriptive solution, I want to suggest that the complex
muddle of takings and its entanglement with other doctrines are
neither bad nor avoidable things. I intend in this Article neither to
condemn conceptual fuzziness nor to lament its inevitability, nor
even to celebrate indeterminacy and imprecision." Case-by-case
adjudication is inevitable in an area where bright lines are
impossible and courts are forced to review an infinite variety of
state regulatory actions. Analytical purity and abstract doctrinal
coherence are likely impossible to achieve in difficult cases, as
courts engage in the imprecise balancing they must perform when
they consider the complex impacts of a regulation on property
rights, as well as the complex political and policy decisions a
government agency made in imposing that regulation. To invoke
16. Penn Central 438 U.S. at 124 (1978).
17. SeeinftaPartIV.
18. In this regard, this Article attempts to carry forward Carol Rose's perspective on
and approach to takings to a post-Lingle world. See, e.g.,
Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions
on PrivateProperty,Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265,
285 (1996) (characterizing takings cases as "messy and fraught with intellectual and even
practical imperfections, but as in most other areas of life, the adjustment of property
relations has a considerable element of 'muddling through'"); Carol M. Rose, Mahon
Reconstructed: Why the Takings Doctrine is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 596 (1984)
(identifying an essential, unresolvable tension at the heart of takings law, and property law
generally, between a prepolitical, acquisitive notion of property and a social, otheroriented conception). For a more recent, thoroughgoing version of this insight, see Marc
R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002).
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the jargon of software design, this messiness is neither a bug nor a
feature in regulatory takings doctrine but part of its operating
instructions, 9 as those instructions have been shaped by the
political and jurisprudential changes wrought by the New Deal and
legal realism.20 The Penn Centraltest in a post-Lingle world, I argue,
offers an explicitly realist solution to the multi-tiered field of land
use and environmental regulation, a tool that grants courts
discretion to make their1 way through the fact-intensive conflicts
2
that hard cases present.
II. LINGLEAND "TAKINGSJURISPRUDENCE"

A relatively brief, straightforward, and unanimous decision,
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. sought to clarify whether courts
should continue to apply a "would-be doctrinal rule or test" that
had been. repeated, though never directly applied, in earlier
Supreme Court decisions.22 Under review in Lingle was a rent
control statute that Hawaii enacted to limit the amount of rent that
gasoline station owners could be charged when the oil companies
from whom they purchased their gasoline were also their
landlords. The state's ultimate purpose in regulating this
particular landlord-tenant relationship was to address concerns
that excessive market concentration in retail gasoline sales in the
state resulted in inflated gas prices for consumers.23 Among other
claims, Chevron alleged that the legislation effected a facial taking
of its property for which compensation was due.2 4 This claim rested
on a single statement in Agins v. City of Tiburon: a legislative act

19. Cf Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 578-80
(1988) (noting the tendency of some areas of property law to rely upon muddy standards
to resolve disputes).
20. See Mark Fenster, Takings, Version 2005: The Legal Process of ConstitutionalProperty
Rights, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 667, 726-27 (2007).
21. SeeinftaPartV.
22. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531-32 (2005); see also id. at 545-46
(citing instances in which the Court had "arguably applied" the Agins "substantially
advances" inquiry, including Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
485-92 (1987), Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987), and Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994), as well as five decisions in which the Court "merely
assumed its validity when referring to it in dicta").

23. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533.
24. Id. at 533-34.
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effects a taking, Justice Powell wrote for a unanimous Court, if it
"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests,... or [it]
denies an owner economically viable use of his land." 5 The second
part of this disjunctive test would later become the basis for the
Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which
held that an owner whose land was left devoid of value after the
application of a regulation could establish a per se taking. 6 The
disjunctive test's first part, which suggests that a property owner
could rest a takings claim on the relative validity and effectiveness
of a regulation, would become the basis for Chevron's victory in
the Ninth Circuit and the Court's focus in Lingle.
The Ninth Circuit had built a small body of precedent on the
so-called Agins "substantially advance" test in a series of decisions
that had invalidated rent control statutes and ordinances that
various appellate panels viewed as ineffective in advancing their
stated goal.27 In Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu,28 the
circuit affirmed the district court's decision that a Honolulu rent
control ordinance constituted an unconstitutional taking.29 At the
time, Hawaiian landowners routinely leased their land to
developers who built condominiums on the property. The
developers in turn sold the condominiums subject to the ground
lease.3" In enacting the rent control ordinance, the city sought to
curtail increases in home prices by limiting the rent that owners of
the underlying land could charge to developers.31 The court held
25. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
26. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
27. Other lower federal and state courts had also applied the Agins test as a standalone basis for takings liability, but not as frequently and stringently as the Ninth Circuit.
See, e.g., Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1579 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Agins
test to conclude that restriction on issuance of hunting licenses to out-of-state hunters
substantially advanced Wyoming's legitimate interest in conserving game animals for its
residents); Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (N.Y. 2004) (applying Agins
test to conclude that restriction on development in conservation areas substantially
advanced the town's legitimate interest in preserving environmentally sensitive areas);
Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 677 (Tex. 2004) (holding that
Agins test remained authoritative and, as such, city's downzoning and moratorium on
development of landowner's parcel substantially advanced city's interest in avoiding ill
effects of urbanization).
28. 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997).
29. Id. at 1166.
30. Id. at 1154.
31. Id. at 1163.
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that the city's efforts failed to promote affordable housing because
the ordinance did not limit developers' ability to include a
premium when pricing their condominiums to the market.12 Thus,
the purchasers would not necessarily enjoy the benefits of rent
control. Applying the Agins test, the circuit held that the ordinance
failed to substantially advance its stated goal and declared it
unconstitutional.3 3
Likewise, in Cashman v. City of Cotati, 4 the Ninth Circuit
evaluated whether Cotati's rent control ordinance advanced the
government's interest in easing rent increases in mobile homes. 5
The plaintiffs-appellants, two mobile home park owners, claimed
that the ordinance constituted a facially unconstitutional
regulatory taking.36 As in Richardson, the circuit noted that the
actual occupants of the mobile homes would not enjoy the benefit
of the rent restriction because an intermediary, the owners of the
mobile homes, could charge them a premium. 7 Once again, the
circuit struck down the ordinance.
A circuit panel had twice reviewed the litigation that would
result in the Supreme Court's Lingle decision. In Chevron v.
Cayetano,"9 the panel vacated the district court's award of summary
judgment to the plaintiff, finding a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the ordinance substantially advanced a legitimate
government interest, but sustaining the trial court's embrace of
the Agins test and reaffirming the circuit's use of the Agins test.4"
On remand, the trial court, sitting as trier of fact, heard the
testimony of competing expert witnesses on the legislation's
practical effects and accepted the view of Chevron's economist that

32. The court in Richardson further found that this same "premium" effect may occur
in the reconveyance of condominiums that had already been sold by developers.
Incumbent owners could resell the condos for the natural market price and capture the
benefit of the ordinance for themselves. Id. at 1165-66.
33. Id. at 1166.
34. 374 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2004).
35. Id. at 897-99.
36. Id. at 891.
37. Id. at 897.
38. Id. at 899.
39. 224 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000).
40. Id. at 1042-44.
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the rent cap provision would in fact result in a price increase.4
Hearing the case once more on appeal, the same Ninth Circuit
panel again affirmed the district court's application of Agins to
Chevron's facial taking claim, and this time affirmed the trial
court's finding that a taking had occurred.42
The Supreme Court reversed, overruling the judgment and
repudiating the Ninth Circuit's application of the disjunctive
language in Agins as a stand-alone taking test.43 The phrase
"substantially advances a legitimate state interest" was a mistake,
the Court declared in Lingle, merely stray language that had no
bearing on the decision in Agins-the classic instance of dicta.44
Much more significantly than its status as dicta, however, the
language was wrong. It inappropriately and incorrectly suggested
that the Takings Clause requires that a regulation "substantially
advance legitimate state interests," without reference to whether
the act had any economic effect on the use of his land.4 5 The
Takings Clause requires a Court to inquire only into "the magnitude
or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon
property owners" and how such burden "is distributed among
property owners. "46 Because the language in Agins enabled judicial
review of a government act's purpose and the relationship between
its function and that purpose, and therefore invited courts "to
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected
legislatures and expert agencies," it belonged within a substantive
due process test rather than a takings test.4" As the Court bluntly
41. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 (D. Haw. 2002).
The expert reasoned that oil companies would most likely raise wholesale gasoline prices
to offset losses resulting from the rental cap. See id. The case had been remanded to the
district from the Ninth Circuit following an appeal of the district court's earlier grant of
summaryjudgment to Chevron. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003
(D. Haw. 1998). The remand required the court to settle a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the state's rent cap legislation would benefit consumers. See Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 103742 (9th Cir. 2000).
42. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004).
43. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 540-41.
46. Id. at 542.
47. Id. at 541-44. This confusion, the Court conceded, extended beyond Agins, and
the Court only began to correct it in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), when it declared the origins of
regulatory takings to be in the Takings Clause rather than in the substantive due process
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declared, the Agins test "has no proper place in our takings
jurisprudence. 48
By removing all but the focus on how a regulation affects a
property owner, the Court thus revealed the logic of the regulatory
takings doctrine and the existence of a heretofore elusive "takings
jurisprudence" that, to put it charitably, has only emerged from a
messily evolutionary process. The logic works like this. A finite,
easily identifiable set of relatively rare types of regulatory effects
receive heightened judicial scrutiny because these types of effects
most clearly constitute the "functional equivalen[ce]" to the
"paradigmatic taking" of eminent domain.4 9 These categorical
types include regulations that entirely remove the value in
property (a category established in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Councit ° ) and those that impose permanent physical invasions (a
category established in Loretto v. Teleprompter CA TV, and extended
to individualized development conditions that require dedication
of land that fail a nexus and proportionality test in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission2 and Dolan v. City of Tigard5 ). When a
plaintiff can demonstrate that her claim falls within one of these
categories, she is likely-and in some cases assured-to be awarded
compensation. But such regulatory acts occur fairly rarely. Outside
of these narrow categories, courts are to apply Penn Central's far
more deferential, multi-factor balancing test to the challenged
regulation.54 This balancing test, too, attempts to identify instances
when a regulation's application constructively confiscates
property-that is, when the various factors, weighed together,
demonstrate that the owner has suffered the functional
equivalence of a taking.

doctrine. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 54142 (citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 197-99).
48. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548.
49. Id. at 537.
50. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
51. 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
52. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
53. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
54. Id. at 538-39. Although this conclusion was foreshadowed in both Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional PlanningAgency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), the unanimous decision in Lingle appears to
provide a stronger affirmation of its broad acceptance by the Court.
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Thus, the regulatory takings review, in which Penn Central
serves as the "polestar," proceeds in two steps. 55 First, courts sort
cases based on the factual circumstances of the regulation's
application. If the regulation causes certain types of effects (total
diminution, physical invasion), the court applies the applicable
higher-scrutiny test. If not, the court concludes that the challenge
is a "partial taking," and a lower scrutiny and more complex test
applies. This latter process constitutes a second step for the
majority of takings challenges: Penn Centra's multi-factor, ad hoc
balancing test. Above all, Lingle clarifies that in all cases, courts
considering a regulatory takings claim may consider only the
challenged regulation's effects on property and the rights of
ownership, and not the validity of the regulation and regulatory
56

program itself.

III. LINGLE'S CLARIFICATION AND DISENTANGLEMENT
Lingle narrowly decided a single case that emerged out of an
errant circuit court, which had wrongly adopted stray dicta as a
stand-alone constitutional test. But Lingle now stands as the most
recent regulatory takings decision the Court has issued, with a
broad, authoritative restatement of the full range of the Court's
approach. Thus, its influence has overshadowed its seemingly
modest holding. Lower federal and state courts have cited
extensively to the doctrinal map that Lingle offers, and they seem
to understand and are following the decision's jurisprudential
logic. Lingle has also forced a number of courts both to abandon
their use of the Agins test and to rethink their approaches to the
relationship between substantive due process and regulatory
takings. Part III briefly surveys the broad acceptance Lingle has
enjoyed, as well as its effect in disentangling the earlier confusion

55. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005). Lingle characterizes
this process as one of categorical sorting; as a practical matter, however, it is also a two-step
process in which a court first must sort by category.
56. In a brief solo concurrence, Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that a
regulation like that challenged in Lingle might be "so arbitrary or irrational as to violate
due process" rather than the Takings Clause. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548-49 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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A. Lingle's Clarification
Lower federal and state courts have understood and
implemented the Court's effort to clarify regulatory takings law in
Lingle. They now quickly dispense with takings claims that
challenge the wisdom and means-ends fit of regulatory acts."
Equally significant, they now view Lingle as the leading regulatory
takings precedent and rely on its restatement of the two-step
sorting process to evaluate takings claims." Lower courts should of
course follow Supreme Court precedent regarding federal
constitutional issues as a matter of law. The apparently banal
observation that they are doing so after Lingle, however, is worthy
of attention, given the longstanding muddle of regulatory takings
law59 and the tendency of lower courts to either willfully or
negligently fail to grasp Supreme Court precedent.'
B. Lingle's Disentanglement: Takings, SubstantiveDue Process, and the
Ninth Circuit
Although state courts that adopted the Agins "substantially
advance" test under their state constitutions need not follow

57. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. Mayfield Hts., 891 N.E.2d 320, 324
(recognizing that Lingle overruled Ohio cases, including Karches v. City of Cincinnati, 526
N.E.2d 1350, 1357-59 (1988) and State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 765 N.E.2d 345, 350-51
(Ohio 2002), that had adopted the Agins test); Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. Oregon State
Bd. of Forestry, 117 P.3d 990, 998-99 (Or. 2005) (en banc) ("After Lingle, plaintiffs first
theory [of an Agins-based takings claim] provides no basis for finding a taking."); City of
Gaylord v. Maple Manor Invs., LLC, No. 266954, 2006 WL 2270494, at *6 (Mich. App. Aug.
8, 2006) (rejecting an Agins claim because "whether the ordinances in question
substantially advance a legitimate government interest has no bearing on whether the
ordinances effected a taking of defendants' property").
-58. See, e.g., Scheehle v. Justices of Supreme Court of Ariz., 508 F.3d 887, 893 (9th
Cir. 2007); Davis v. Brown, 851 N.E.2d 1198, 1204 (Ill. 2006); Scofield v. State Dep't. of
Natural Res., 753 N.W.2d 345, 359-60 (Neb. 2008); McCarran Int'l Airport v. Sisolak, 137
P.3d 1110, 1122, 1125 n.71 (Nev. 2006); Wild Rice River Estates, Inc. v. City of Fargo, 705
N.W.2d 850, 854 (N.D. 2005); Boice v. Ottawa Hills, No. L-06-1208, 2007 WL 2458488, at
*6-7 (Ohio App., Aug. 31, 2007); Benson v. State, 710 N.W.2d 131, 149, 152 (S.D. 2006).
59. For a collection of complaints about the takings doctrine's muddle and
vagueness, see Poirier, supra note 18, at 97 n.2.
60. See supra note 9, and accompanying text.
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Lingle's command,6 courts that applied the test under the federal
Constitution must do so, and indeed have done so. 6 2 More than
any other federal or lower state court, the Ninth Circuit has been
affected by Lingle, and not merely because the Supreme Court
overturned a decision from that circuit. For nearly ten years prior
to Lingle, the Ninth Circuit had taken what in retrospect appears to
have been a curious approach to the relationship between takings
and substantive due process. At the same time that it relied upon
the "substantially advances" test in Agins to perform a somewhat
rigorous review of a regulation's purpose and effect under the
Takings Clause, especially in evaluating claims against rent control
legislation, the Ninth Circuit barred substantive due process claims
that would perform virtually the same review. Following Lingle's
logic, this makes little sense; but at the time, the circuit's approach
was merely the most prominent and well-developed example of the
judiciary's confusion about takings. It therefore serves as the best
means to understand the unintended consequences of that
confusion. Lingle's direct effects on the Ninth Circuit thus reveal
how Lingle's disentanglement of the doctrine has worked.
1. Pre-Lingle: Where substantive due process had gone.
As discussed previously, the Ninth Circuit had incorporated, via
Agins, a stand-alone, substantive-due-process-like test in its
regulatory takings doctrine.6" This approach was logical in light of
the circuit's en banc decision in Armendariz v. Penman, which held
that substantive due process claims were not available to plaintiffs
who either also raised takings claims or whose substantive due
process claims looked like takings claims."4 The plaintiffs in

61. See, e.g., Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 674
(Tex. 2004); see also Texas Bay Cherry Hill, L.P. v. City of Fort Worth, 257 S.W.3d 379, 395
n.5 (Tex. App. 2008) (noting that the Texas Supreme Court has not yet responded to
Lingle by reconsidering its earlier adoption of the "substantially advance" test as a test
under the Texas constitution).
62. See, e.g., Small Prop. Owners of S.F. v. City and County of S.F., 141 Cal. App. 4th
1388, 1405 n.10 (App. Ct. 2006) (noting that Lingle had resulted in the rejection of
"substantially advances" test that a California intermediate appellate court had applied in
Action Apartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 94 Cal. App. 4th 587, 621 (App. Ct.
2001)).
63. See text accompanying supra notes 27-42.
64. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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Armendariz were owners and former owners of low-income housing
units in San Bernardino, California. Their Section 1983 claim
alleged, among other things, that city officials' aggressive efforts to
enforce local housing codes against purported gang activity and
blighted property violated their federal constitutional substantive
due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In its decision in Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court had held
that the broader protection of substantive due process should not
extend to situations where explicit constitutional provisions, such
as those in the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, protect individual
rights.65 Relying on Graham, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the
plaintiffs' claims under the specific constitutional amendments
that covered their factual claims rather than the broad substantive
due process doctrine. 6
In doing so, the court in Armendariz effectively rewrote the
plaintiffs' complaint.67 It viewed their property-based allegationsthey asserted that the city officials' actual motive in its aggressive
enforcement was to assist a private developer who coveted
plaintiffs' property-as constituting a claim that the government
sought to take property on behalf of a private interest. Viewed this
way, the plaintiffs were alleging a "private taking" and a violation of
their right to compensation for the loss of their property rather
than a substantive due process violation.' Similarly, their claim
that the government's overly aggressive enforcement of the
housing codes unconstitutionally interfered with their property
rights in fact alleged unreasonable seizures that violated the
Fourth Amendment.69 By applying Graham broadly, the Ninth
Circuit thus shrunk the universe of possible substantive due
process claims. This approach would prove fatal to claims that

•65. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989).
66. Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1321-24.
67. When Armendariz was still good law in the Ninth Circuit, Nicole Garnett argued
that it had the effect of removing from judicial review claims against land-use-like actions
that concerned the authority of the state to pursue other motives, for example, crime
control, via land use regulation in housing code enforcement sweeps-under the guise
that such claims actually concerned a loss of property values. This translation that
Armendariz required in fact did violence to property owners' claims. See Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Relocating Disorder,91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1090-91 (2005).
68. See Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1314-15, 1320-21.
69. Id. at 1320.
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government land use and environmental regulations violated
substantive due process rights; such claims, under Armendariz, were
subsumed Within takings claims.7" Worse still for plaintiffs, their
takings claims typically proved unavailing unless they could
persuade a court that either their claim fell within one of the
categories of claims eligible for higher scrutiny or the court should
apply the "substantially advances" test from Agins.
Other courts did not embrace the Ninth Circuit's absolutist
approach towards property-based substantive due process claims.7
The D.C. and Eleventh Circuits refused to hold that substantive
due process claims regarding property were subsumed within
takings claims.72 The First and Fifth Circuits suggested that while
the two doctrines overlap, a substantive due process claim could
nevertheless be made and adjudicated along with a takings claim
depending upon the facts of an individual case and the quality of a
plaintiff's claims.7 3 The Seventh Circuit had independently
precluded substantive due process claims against land use
regulations because of the deference owed to economic
regulations, not because of Graham.74 Commentators were no
kinder to Armendariz than other federal circuits, whether because
the Ninth Circuit's application of Graham or Graham itself
eviscerated and misunderstood the substantive due process
doctrine,75 or because it was overbroad and incoherent in its
characterization of how one constitutional right could subsume
another. 6 This reception proved irrelevant to the Ninth Circuit,
70. See, e.g., Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 950 (9th Cir. 2004);
Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2002); Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d
1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999); Macri v. King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 1997);
Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir. 1996).
71. See generally Consol. Waste Sys., LLC v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson, No.
M2002-02582-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1541860, at *15-25 (Tenn. Ct. App., Jun 30, 2005)
(offering erudite, comprehensive overview of federal circuit courts' response to
Armendariz, and ultimately rejecting.the Ninth Circuit's approach).
72. Tri County Indus., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 104 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Villas of LakeJackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, 121 F.3d 610 (11th Cir. 1997).
73. S. County Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of S. Kingstown, 160 F.3d 834, 835-36 (1st
Cir. 1998); Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris County, 236 F.3d 240, 247-49 (5th Cir. 2000).
74. Gosnell v. City of Troy, Ill., 59 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995); Coniston Corp. v.
Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1988).
75. See Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural
Due Process, and the Bill ofRights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 855-62 (2003).
76. See Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal,51
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which held fast in its determination to sweep substantive due
process claims from the federal courts within its jurisdiction."
2. Disentanglement after Lingle: The Ninth Circuitresponds.
Lingle explicitly held that takings claims and substantive due
process claims were doctrinally and analytically distinct. The
former is focused on the regulation's effects and its remedy is
compensation, while the latter is focused on the regulation's
validity and its remedy is invalidation. Therefore, the Armendariz
Court's conclusion that the Takings Clause subsumes propertybased claims for invalidation under the substantive due process
doctrine is no longer viable. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit did
not initially seem to recognize that fact. Only a few weeks after the
Supreme Court issued Lingle, a panel of the Ninth Circuit had the
opportunity to reconsider its stance on substantive due process in
Spoklie v. Montana." In Spoklie, owners of an "alternative livestock"
ranch in Montana made both takings and substantive due process
claims in their challenge to a state law that would severely limit the
use of their ranch.79 After affirming the dismissal of the takings
claim because it depended on the 'substantially advances' test that
the Court wrote out of the canon of takings tests in Lingle, the
court also affirmed the dismissal of the substantive due process
claim."0 In the latter aspect of its decision, the court, summarily
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims on
the grounds that the law was not "irrational and arbitrary."8"
Although it made no difference for Spoklie and his co-plaintiffs,
the court at least entertained the merits of their substantive due
process claim, as it gave consideration to a type of claim that it had
refused to review just two years previously in Squaw Valley, the
circuit's most recent affirmation of Armendariz.82 Without explicitly
mentioning either Armendariz or Lingle, however, the court in

ALA. L. REV. 977, 1003-04 (2000).
77. See, e.g., Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir. 2004).
78. 411 F.3d 1051, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2005).
79. Id. at 1054.
80. Id. at 1057-59.
81. Id. at 1059.
82. See, e.g., Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 950.
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Spoklie did not explain its reasons for reaching the due process
claim, nor did it explicitly overturn the circuit's precedent
suggesting it should not have done so.
In two separate challenges to mobile home rent control
ordinances, the chief judge of the Northern District of California
more explicitly recognized that Lingle might have some effect on
Armendariz.3 Reaching the merits of the due process claims in both
decisions, Judge Vaughn Walker asserted both that the Court
sought to "revitalize[] the due process clause in the takings
context" in Lingle, and that after Lingle, a due process claim was the
only means to challenge "the means-ends relationship of a statute"
and to question "whether a regulation is effective in achieving a
legitimate public purpose." 4 In one case, he granted the
defendant city's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
plaintiffs effort to seek an unfair return on its investment did not
state a proper due process claim, 5 and in the other he allowed a
due process challenge to a rent control ordinance to proceed. 6
Neither Spoklie nor Judge Vaughn's decisions established a
trend, however, either in the circuit's district courts or in the
Ninth Circuit itself. Some courts were able to avoid the issue by
deciding substantive due process claims on other grounds." Other
circuit court panels and district courts simply chose to ignore the
Lingle decision while continuing to uphold Armendariz as precedent
or follow its logic throughout much of 2007.8 Indeed, two Ninth

83. MHC Fin. Ltd. P'ship v. City of San Rafael, No. COO-3785 VRW, 2006 WL
3507937, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. City of Hayward,
No. C 03-0891 VRW, 2006 WL 3365598, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2006); See also City of
Oakland v. Abend, No. C-07-2142 EMC, 2007 WL 2023506, at *10-11, *14 (N.D. Cal. July
12, 2007) (magistrate judge denying motion to dismiss substantive due process claim,
finding that it was sufficiently pled and analytically distinct from plaintiffs' takings claim,
which it found to be premature and could not yet be adjudicated).
84. Borello, 2006 WL 3365598, at *3-4.
85. Id:
86. MHC, 2006 WL 3507937 at *9-10.
87. See, e.g., Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola, No. C 04-5138JFPVT,
2005 WL 1774247, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2005) (staying claims pursuant to Younger
abstention); Adver. Display Sys. 1, LLC v. City of S.F., No. C 06-1020 SBA, 2006 WL
1646138 at *4 (N.D. Cal June 14, 2006) (dismissing substantive due process claims for lack
of standing); MHC Fin. Ltd. P'ship Two v. City of Santee, 234 F. App'x 439 (9th Cir. 2007)
(upholding dismissal of substantive due process claim on grounds that one-year statute of
limitations had run).
88. See, e.g., Humane Society-Western Region v. Snohomish County, No. C05-0377-
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Circuit panels explicitly applied Armendariz in unpublished
decisions in 2007.9 Nor has the Ninth Circuit been the only court
to make this mistake. A federal district court in Utah continued to
presume that the Graham doctrine applies after Lingle by
suggesting that the ripeness requirements applied to a regulatory
takings claim "subsume" the ripeness analysis of a substantive due
process claim.9" The court's misapplication of Graham led to the
correct result for the wrong reason. As the Tenth Circuit has
correctly held, a plaintiff's substantive due process claim
challenging a government agency's land use decision must wait
until the plaintiff has utilized all of the procedures the government
provides, because the due process claim is parallel to, but not
subsumed by, a takings claim. 1
After more than two years following the Lingle ruling, the Ninth
Circuit finally began to more formally and explicitly reincorporate
substantive due process into the takings context. First, in Equity
Lifestyles Property v. County of San Luis Obispo, a panel conceded that
Lingle had clarified the distinction between takings and due
MAT, 2007 WL 2404619, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2007) (applying Armendariz to due
process challenge); Adver. Display Sys., No. C 06-1020 SBA, 2006 WL 1646138 at *4 (N.D.
Cal. June 14, 2006) (upholding Armendariz as barring substantive due process claim despite
dismissing claims for lack of standing); Sadri v. Ulmer, No. 06-00430 ACK-KSC, 2007 WL
869192, at *7 (D. Haw., Mar. 21, 2007) (applying Armendariz and failing to cite Lingle in
ruling that the Takings Clause "preempted" substantive due process claim against county's
decision to rescind and suspend various land use entitlements); Star Nw., Inc. v. City of
Kenmore, No. C05-2133P, 2006 WL 2372395, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2006)
(assuming that Armendariz remains good law); Besaro Mobile Home Park, LLC v. City of
Fremont, No. C05-2886 CW, 2006 WL 2990201, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2006) (dismissing
substantive due process claim because it could be analyzed under Takings Clause). This
was true even outside the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Coates v. Hall, No. SA-06-CV-773-XR, 2007
WL 1091329, at *2 (W.D. Tex. April 10, 2007) (citing Lingle but finding that substantive
due process claim against water conservation district for its denial to issue permit to allow
plaintiff to pump groundwater was subsumed within takings claim against district).
89. Jones v. City of McMinnville, 244 F. App'x 755, 761 (9th Cir. 2007) ("We have
broadly applied Armendariz in actions involving takings."); Hays v. Hallberg, 247 F. App'x
865, 866 (9th Cir. 2007) ("In the Ninth Circuit, it is well settled that substantive due
process claims pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment are precluded when the interest at
stake is real property.").
90. See Highland Dev., Inc. v. Duchesne County, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1157-59 (D.
Utah 2007).
91. See Signature Prop. Int'l Ltd. P'ship v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1265-66
(10th Cir. 2002). The ripeness requirement for takings claims against land use decisions,
as well as for substantive due process claims against.land use decisions, was articulated by
the Supreme Court in Williamson County Reg'l PlanningComm'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 186-97 (1985).
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process and thereby rendered the Takings Clause unable to
remedy due process violations.92 Then, in Crown Point Development,
Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, a circuit panel for the first time explicitly
recognized that Lingle restricted Armendariz, noting that the
Supreme Court had "pull[ed] the rug ofit" from under the
rationale for the circuit's preclusion of substantive due process
claims in the takings context."3 Without an explicit textual source
of constitutional protection to pre-empt a substantive due process
claim, the court concluded, it would be required to consider a due
process claim separately--unless, however, a property owner's
complaint falls within one of the established "categories" for
takings claims (i.e., complete deprivation of economically
beneficial uses, permanent physical invasions, or a victorious claim
under the Penn Central factors).9 This, too, seems quite confused,
suggesting that a winning regulatory takings claim could not also
be part of a complaint alleging a successful substantive due process
claim. Nothing in Lingle supports this conclusion. The Crown Point
panel's confusion carried over to the panel in Action Apartment
Association v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board, which expanded on
Crown Point Development's suggestion that the takings/due process
relationship was one of relative, not complete independence. 9 "An
arbitrary deprivation of [the right to use property]," the court
held, "may give rise to a viable substantive due process claim in any
case in which the Takings Clause does not provide a preclusive
cause of action."96 The circuit had finally recognized the changes
Lingle had made to the relationship between regulatory takings
and substantive due process, even if it remained somewhat
confused as to the full extent Of Lingle's effects.

92. See Equity Lifestyles Prop., Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 505 F.3d 860, 870
n.16 (9th Cir. 2007). Although the court reached plaintiffs' due process claim, it
characterized the standard review of that claim as quite deferential and found that because
both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit had upheld rent control laws as rationally
related to the legitimate public purpose of protecting consumers, the challenged law
could pass constitutional muster. Id. at 870-71.
93. 506 F.3d 851, 854-56 (9th Cir. 2007).
94. Id. at 855-56 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) and
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
95. Action Apartment Ass'n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 102526 (9th Cir. 2007).
96. Id.
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To say that a substantive due process claim is available as a
complement to a separate and distinct takings claim is not to say
that it will prove victorious, of course. In fact, recent Ninth Circuit
decisions suggest that the distinction Lingle made between takings
and due process claims constitutes a formal rather than substantive
triumph for property owners. In Shanks v. Dressel,9 v for example,
after holding that the property owners' Section 1983 action against
the city of Spokane for its alleged failure to adequately enforce its
zoning regulations could include a substantive due process claim, a
Ninth Circuit panel found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
substantive due process claim against actions that fell short of
being "constitutionally arbitrary.""8 Other decisions have followed
this pattern.'
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, however, the analytical
distinction between regulatory takings and substantive due process
has taken hold, and academics, judges, and perhaps even attorneys
can rest more easily now that they better understand the respective
doctrines. For a doctrine that had previously been plagued by
indeterminacy and that a decade earlier had seemed an
instrument of political arguments between anti-regulatory property
rights advocates and pro-regulatory environmentalists and
planners, Lingle's settlement and clarification seems to have
delivered a sense of at least a temporary ending.
IV. PENN CENTRAL, AFTER LINGLE

At the same time, however, Lingle itself seems a bit confused. Its
clarification and disentanglement left at the center of the
regulatory takings doctrine the first contemporary regulatory
takings decision, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New

97. 540 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2008).
98. Id. at 1088-89.
99. See, e.g.,
N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 485-86 (9th Cir. 2008);
Equity Lifestyles Prop., Inc. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 505 F.3d 860, 871 (9th Cir.
2007). Cf Action Apartment Ass'n, 509 F.3d at 1026-27 (explaining that substantive due
process claims time barred); Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 506 F.3d 851, 856
(9th Cir. 2007) (overruling District Court's dismissal of plaintiff's substantive due process
claim under Armendariz, and remanding the case for the claim to be considered in a
summaryjudgment motion).
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York. ' That decision articulated a multi-factor, ad hoc balancing
test that represents the core inquiry for the judicial review of
government regulations under the Takings Clause.' ° And that
balancing test, in turn, forces courts to consider, among other
things, the "character" of the government's regulatory act. °2 This
seems odd, if not contradictory. If the Penn Central balancing test
survives Lingle, as the decision declared that it does, then the Court
may have kept intact a small, narrow form of substantive due
process analysis in the "character of the government action" factor.
Perhaps the Court failed to notice that Penn Central appears to
require courts to consider how the government acted, or perhaps
Lingle fibbed when it declared that the regulatory takings doctrine
focused solely on a regulation's effects. Either alternative
undercuts Lingle's claim to discover a unified, logical takings
jurisprudence.
Part IV and Part V attempt to make sense of Lingle in light of
this conflict. They suggest that Lingle's focus on a regulation's
effects did not, and should not, sweep Penn Central's "character"
factor entirely away. The argument proceeds as follows. I begin in
this Part by reviewing Penn Central, especially its introduction and
discussion of the "character of the government action" factor, and
then explain how the Court had confusingly deployed that term in
the years prior to Lingle. I then describe Lingle's discussion of Penn
Central and the "character" factor, and argue that Lingle offers an
open-ended understanding of "character" for future courts to
utilize, though as a secondary consideration in relation to the
challenged regulation's effects on the subject property, which is
the Takings Clause's primary concern. Then, in Part V, I elaborate
on the current state of the character factor and locate the source
of this approach in the Court's current approach to regulatory
takings. With that in mind, I discuss recent state and lower federal
court decisions since Lingle that illustrate the problems courts face

100. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (characterizing the
Penn Central factors as "the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that
do not fall within the physical takings or Lucas rules"); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,concurring) ("Our polestar instead remains the principles
set forth in Penn Centralitself .. ").
101. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
102. Id.
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in applying the Penn Central factors after Lingle, and thereby
suggest why the "character of the government action," as a limited
source of judicial discretion in complex factual circumstances, is
likely to remain a relatively broad inquiry.
A. The "Character"Test in Penn Central
Despite a cavalcade of complaints about Penn Central-it's too
indeterminate and muddled, most agree,"'3 and for that reason too
4
has remained the
lenient towards regulators, some argue° '-it
core precedent for regulatory takings. Later decisions of
consequence have either identified instances when Penn Central's
deferential balancing test should not apply or have resolved
ancillary issues. The Penn Central plaintiffs, owners of Grand
Central Terminal in Manhattan, had attempted to construct an
office building on top of the railway station.0 The terminal had
recently been designated a historical landmark by the New York
City Landmark Commission, however, and as a result the plaintiffs
needed approval from the Commission before they could
construct their proposed tower."0 6 After the Commission rejected
their proposals for the building, they filed suit, claiming that they
were due compensation from the city under the Takings Clause for
the Commission's refusal to allow them to build.0 7
Reviewing its first regulatory takings challenge in more than a
generation, the Court identified "several factors that have
particular significance" in the "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"
a court makes when considering a takings claim: the "economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations," and "the character of the
governmental action."' ' The Court held that the city owed no

103. SeePoirier, supra note 18, at97 n.2.
104. See, e.g., Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-CenturyRetrospective
on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 679,
681-82 (2005) (arguing that Penn Centrals indeterminacy has given license to
governmental over-regulation and rent-seeking behavior).
105. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116.
106. Id. at 110-12.
107. Id. at 115-19.
108. Id. at 124. The discussion that follows-and, indeed, the entirety of this Part of
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compensation, because the regulation did not interfere with the
plaintiffs continued operation of the terminal, and the
Commission could still approve a scaled-down proposal for an
office building.'
Therefore, the Commission's actions did not
affect the terminal's value or frustrate the plaintiffs' financial
expectations."' In addition, the regulation was imposed by broadly
applicable legislation that was intended to preserve historically
significant property. As such, it was a permissible exercise of the
city's police power, and its legislative legitimacy weighed in the
City's favor."'
In its discussion of the three factors that composed Penn
Centrals ad hoc balancing test, the Court explained the character
factor this way:
A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, see, e.g., United States v. Causby . . .

,

than when

interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good.'1

This sentence points in two directions at once. Its first half, which
cites to the Court's 1946 Causby decision that found compensation
was due for the occupation by military airplanes of the airspace
over the plaintiffs farm,"' suggests that "character" refers to the
effect that the specific type of government action has on the

the Article-assumes that the Penn Central balancing test sits at the core of regulatory
takings law. Gary Lawson and two co-authors have argued that this constitutes a mistaken
reading of Penn Central and that "[t]he structure of the Court's argument did not follow
the analysis set forth in the [passage introducing the test], nor did the Court specifically
relate its subsequent detailed discussion [of the case's facts] to the factors mentioned."
Gary Lawson et al., "Oh Lord, Please Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood!': Rediscovering the
Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 32 (2005).
Although this may be a correct historical claim about the Court's original intent for Penn
Central as my subsequent discussion makes clear, in subsequent cases the Court proceeded
as though the three-factor balancing test in fact does matter, and that the Court has tried
to provide content to its "character" test.
109. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-38.
110. Id.
111. Id at 132-34.
112. Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
113. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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plaintiffs property. Its second half, however, suggests a far broader
inquiry into how a regulation affects all property subject to the
government action, and into the aims the regulation seeks to
further. This is not a single, unified test, then, but ajudicial license
to look broadly at a plaintiff's description of what she experienced
from the regulation's effects and at the government's description
of what it was attempting to accomplish. The sentence's first half
advises a court to scrutinize more closely the atypical, significantly
disruptive regulation than the legislative effort that applies broadly
to property owners and achieves an important goal. In
adjudicating the dispute, then, the court should consider whether
the defining "character" of the government action is its extensive
disruption of the owner's expectations and use of her property.
But the sentence's second half advises that a court should give
some deference to the government if it can show that the
"character" of its action is a broadly applicable regulation that
adjusts burdens and benefits to promote the common good.
"Character," in sum, concerns the characteristics of a
regulation's effects and of the regulation itself. Later discussions in
Penn Central failed to clarify this dual meaning any further, but
instead merely reiterated the importance of looking at all of the
factors the Court had identified." 4 It did not matter, the Court
said, that the Landmarks Commission was not keeping the
property owners from engaging in nuisance-like uses. The city's
effort to preserve valuable historical properties was consistent with
other governmental efforts to curb noxious uses and spread
collective benefits that survived takings challenges." 5
B. Confusing Signals After Penn Central
In the decades since Penn Central, the "character" factor has
become no less ambiguous."' At times, the Court has applied

114. Penn Central 438 U.S. at 130-31.
115. Id. at 134 n.30 (citing Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962)).
116. In the description that follows, I provide a more impressionistic description of
post-Penn Central discussions of the character factor than John Echeverria, who heroically
identifies nine different meanings in the Court's decisions. John Echeverria, Making Sense
of Penn Central, 23 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 171, 183-99 (2005). Christopher Goodin
has likewise proposed a schema to describe how courts and commentators have
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"character" as though its focus is on a regulation's effects. This
approach has distinguished two types of regulations that, the Court
has concluded, infringe on two traditional aspects of ownership
rights. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States"7 and Loretto v. Teleprompter
ManhattanCAT," s both decided soon after Penn Central,the Court
held that excessive physical invasions of private property
constituted a type of government action that necessarily effected a
taking. An invasion, the Court explained in Kaiser Aetna,
confiscates "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude
others.""' 9 The character of the government action proved so
egregious in these cases that the other Penn Centralfactors carried
no weight in the balance, even when the economic impact on the
property owner was minimal, as was clear in Loretto.' By the time it
decided Lingle, the Court had incorporated this understanding of
character into step-one of its regulatory takings test. 2'
The Court has deployed the same language and reasoning
when faced with claims that government action forced owners to
forfeit their right to devise their property. In Hodel v. Irving, owners
of Indian lands challenged federal legislation that barred those
with small, fractional interest in land from passing that interest by
inheritance. Instead, in order to consolidate Indian holdings and
enable more efficient use of the land, the legislation required the
land to escheat to the specific tribe on whose reservation or in

understood the character factor. See Christopher Goodin, The Role and Content of the
Characterof the GovernmentalAction Factor in a PartialRegulatory Takings Analysis, 29 U. HAW.
L. REV. 437, 441-57 (2007) (distinguishing approaches to the character factor that view it as
"promoting the common good" and those that view it as "adjusting the burdens and
benefits of economic life").
117. 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979) (explaining that imposition of a navigational servitude
constitutes "an actual physical invasion of [a] privately owned marina").
118. 458 U.S. 419, 426, 438 (1982) (explaining that installations of cable equipment
on property owner's apartment building constitutes a "permanent physical invasion").
119. KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 176.
120. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VIcKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 168 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that on remand, the victorious plaintiff was awarded
only $1 in compensation, and even lost in her claim for attorney fees as the prevailing
party in constitutional litigation).
121. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (characterizing the
physical invasion and total deprivation categories as per se takings not subject to Penn
Centralanalysis).
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whose jurisdiction the land fell.1 2 The value of the interests taken,
the Court found, could be "substantial," although in many
instances it was not. It was "dubious" that owners.had investmentbacked expectations in that interest, and the legislation offered
significant reciprocity of advantage insofar as consolidation of the
interests would undoubtedly benefit tribes whose land had
suffered under the weight of increasingly fractionated interests.'2 3
This side of the Penn Central balance-the economic impact on the
owner-weighed against compensation. But the status of the right
to devise fell into the same category of "essential" private rights as
the right to exclude, and accordingly the character of the
government action in taking that right required compensation.'24
This holding, reiterated a decade later in Babbitt v. Youpee, 25 again
suggests that the character test focuses narrowly on the effect that
the type of action the government engages in has on a particular
aspect of the property owner's interest.'2 6
Other decisions have taken the opposite approach. Most
prominently, in performing the Penn Central balancing test the
Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
emphasized the importance of the regulation's aims and general
effects rather than its specific effects on the individual. 2 ' Under
review in Keystone Bituminous was state legislation that required coal
companies to leave in place fifty percent of the coal beneath

122. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 708-09 (1987).
123. Id. at 714-16.
124. Id. at 716-17.
125. 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
126. The Court has also suggested additional types of government action whose
character might warrant compensation to an affected property owner. A four-justice
plurality of the Court stated that a statute imposing retroactive liability can effect a taking
because of the unjust and disfavored nature of such a government action. See Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 532-33 (1998).Justice Kennedy's lone concurrence and
the four dissenting justices would instead have analyzed a claim against retroactivity as one
sounding in substantive due process. See id, at 538-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with plurality's takings analysis, while asserting that government's actions
violated substantive due process rights); id. at 553-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with plurality's takings and substantive due process analyses). Dicta in Tahoe-Sierra
suggested that when a government acts in bad faith, it may be liable for compensation. See
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 333
(2002). See generally Echeverria, supra note 116, at 198-99 (summarizing the Court's "good
faith/bad faith" statements in its post-Penn Central discussions).
127. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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certain enumerated structures. When the state legislature sought
to protect against the subsidence of surface land areas, the Court
found, it was "acting to protect the public interest in health, the
environment,

and

the fiscal integrity of the

area. 1 28

Citing

Mahon,129

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
the 1922 decision that Lingle
characterized as the "[b]eginning" of the modern regulatory
takings doctrine,' ° the Court in Keystone Bituminous asserted that
"the nature of the State's interest in the regulation is a critical
factor in determining whether a taking has occurred, and thus
whether compensation is required."''
If Keystone Bituminous represents an especially governmentfriendly regulatory takings decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,5 2 one of the high-water marks for strong property rights
protection, also suggests that courts can consider the significance
of the government's challenged regulatory program. Lucas
exempted from the Penn Centralbalancing test instances in which a
regulation resulted in land with no economic value, 3 but also
allowed the government to defend its actions from constitutional
liability for compensation if it could demonstrate that its
regulation sought to enforce "background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership.""' Justice Scalia's decision in Lucas also restricted this
defense by circumscribing the background principles that
composed the state's defense to the peculiarities of the particular
relevant state's law, and by implying that the "background" ended
sometime in the late nineteenth century, when the common law of
private and public nuisance began to give way to.local, state, and
federal legislation enacted under the relevant legislature's police
power authority. 5 When the property owner is left with nothing
but bare title to valueless land, the state should not escape

128. Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 485-86 (citing both Penn Central and Agins to
identify the source of the Court's emphasis on the legislation's "public purpose").
129. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
130. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
131. Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 488.
132. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
133. Id. at 1017-18.
134. Id. at 1029.
135. Id. at 1029-31.
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compensation for the owner's right to engage in non-nuisance
activities, with "nuisance" defined as narrowly as possible. Viewed
one way, then, Lucas appeared to offer the state an escape from
liability by referring to the character of its action as nuisance
abatement, but it made the hatch so small as to be nearly
impossible to use.
But the gesture itself is significant.'3 6 Even in the most
exploitative circumstance, when the state has stripped the owner's
property of all value, compensation is not due if the state can
identify a common law principle of nuisance under which the
owner's use of her property was prohibited. Treading a difficult
course between a recognition of the state's traditional police
power authority and the Lucas majority's vision of supple, wellprotected property rights, Lucas cast doubt on the judiciary's
ability to distinguish regulations that address harm from those that
spread benefits. If allowed to consider nuisance broadly, Lucas
suggested, the state and solicitous courts would allow unlimited
expansion of the doctrine, and thereby enable a boundless
regulatory state to avoid paying compensation in all cases. In less
fraught circumstances-that is, when the diminution of value is
less than total-the state should be able to address a broader set of
concerns, and should also be able to identify the increased property
value the owner enjoys as a result of a regulatory program that also
restricts her neighbors' property. Lucas implies that in evaluating
all government action, courts should inquire into the regulation's
intent and basis, but suggests that this inquiry should shift based
on the amount of value remaining in the subject property. When
that value is greater than zero, which is to say when Penn Central
applies, that inquiry may extend beyond the constrained
"traditional background principles" of common law that Lucas
prescribes.
The plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, with Justice
O'Connor writing for fourjustices in finding that Congress's effort
to protect the health benefits of coal miners effected a taking,

136. See Garrett Power, Regulatmy Takings: A Chronicle of the Construction of a
Constitutional Concept (University of Maryland School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
No, 2008-21, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129774, at 33, 39.
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utilized both senses of character from Penn Central.,"7 The
government's "legislative remedy for what it perceived to be a
grave problem" was "understandable," one worthy of a legislative
solution, the plurality wrote." 8 But the character of that solution,
the government's unfair singling out of the plaintiff coal
companies through a substantial, retroactive burden unrelated to
any commitment they had made or injury they had caused,
"implicate[d] fundamental principles of fairness underlying the
Takings Clause. '
Viewed comprehensively as the Eastern Enterprises plurality did
in requiring compensation, the character test encompasses all of
Penn Central's factors and appears to include some consideration of
the government's aims and efforts to meet those aims. Prior to
Lingle, then, one could certainly complain that the Court had
failed in its original iteration of the Penn Centralfactors and in its
subsequent application of them to provide a coherent, unified
definition of the "character of the governmental action."
Alternatively, one could also take the Court at its word and by its
subsequent actions and conclude that the character test broadly
considers both regulatory effects and regulatory aims. The
question with which I approach Lingle in Part lV.C is whether
Lingle expunges or limits the character factor from the Penn Central
test as part of, or as a consequence of, its decision to eliminate the
"substantially advances" test in Agins.
C. Lingle and the CharacterFactor
As it performed its useful project of banishing the Agins test
and focusing the takings inquiry on a regulation's effects on the
property owner, the Court could have taken the opportunity to
develop a more analytically precise and coherent approach to
partial takings. The "economic impact" and "investment-backed
expectations" factors, which focus on the regulation's effects on
the subject property, are consistent with Lingle's narrow focus. If
the "character" factor broadens the judicial inquiry into the
government's regulatory purpose, it is incompatible with Lingle's
137. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion).
138. Id.at 537.
139. Id.
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logic and, if the Court sought analytical purity, it could have
discarded the "character" test from Penn Centralaltogether.4 '
Lingle did not in fact do this, however. In proclaiming Penn
Central's canonical position at the core of regulatory takings
analysis, Lingle explicitly retained all of the components of Penn
Centrals multi-factor balancing test. Indeed, it even quoted the
language that the original decision used in establishing the
factors.' The Court indicated a subtle shift in the balancing test's
application, as it characterized the "economic impact" and
"investment-backed expectations" factors as "[p]rimary among
[Penn Central's] factors."'42 But it also stated that the "character of
the governmental action" factor "may be relevant in discerning
whether a taking has occurred." 43 And although the verb "may"
suggests that the character factor is less significant than those that
concern the economic impacts on the property owner, Lingle
reaffirmed the factor's existence. Relative to the other factors,
"character" has diminished in importance, but it has survived
44
Lingle.
But what does the "character" factor consider? Lingle does not
explicitly or even directly resolve this issue. Its explanation that a
regulatory takings inquiry should focus on the "magnitude or
character of the burden" placed on the property owner appears
consistent with the notion that the character factor focuses on the
character of the regulation's effect on the particular individualthat is, as a means to consider the extent to which the regulation
approximates those functional equivalences of a physical taking
that Loretto and Lucas had identified. 4 5 By limiting "character"
140. $ee Dale A. Whitman, DeconstructingLingle: Implicationsfor Takings Doctrine, 40J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 573, 581-82 (2007).
141. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
142. Id. at 538-39.
143. Id. at 539; see also id. at 540 (stating that "the Penn Central inquiry turns in large
part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the
degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests") (emphasis added).
144. See also Eagle, supra note 12, at 916 (finding that the language of Lingle makes
plain the character test's continuing viability).
145. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542; Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem ofEquality in Takings,
102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2008); Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construingthe Canon: An Exegesis of
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENrL. L.J. 63, 100-01
(2008). Two state courts have come to this conclusion. See City of Coeur d'Alene v.
Simpson, 136 P.3d 310, 318 n.5 (Idaho 2006) (reading the post-Lingle "character" test as
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narrowly in this manner, Lingle would allow the Penn Centraltest to
focus solely on the severity of the regulation's impact on a property
owner. 4 6 If it did not entirely dispense with the "character" factor,
then surely Lingle limited its scope.'4 7
But such a narrow understanding of "character" faces three
problems. First, the Court never explicitly stated that Lingle was
intended to limit Penn Central's balancing test. Instead, it reiterated
the dual, open-ended, and ambiguous explanation from Penn
Central. To be sure, Lingle privileged the two other factors that
focused on the regulation's effects over that the "character"
factor. 48 But by retaining the "character" factor, the Court
suggested that its inquiry is distinct from those factors that focus
only on a regulation's localized effects on the property owner.
Moreover, if all three of the factors merely consider the
regulation's effects on the property owner, as a narrow
understanding of "character" would hold, then what exactly is the
ad hoc balancing test supposed to balance? Viewed as a narrow test
of regulatory effect, the character factor provides no balance;
rather, the ad hoc balancing test offers three slightly different ways
to consider the same thing.'49
Second, a narrow "character" test would duplicate the inquiry
that courts make during step-one of the regulatory takings
review."' Recall that Penn Centrals first explanation of the test was
that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical
encompassing only an inquiry into whether the regulation constitutes a physical invasion);
Mansaldo v. New Jersey, 898 A.2d 1018, 1024 (N.J. 2006) (concluding that Lingle had
barred "considerations of 'legitimate state interests"' from takings claims).
146. Barros, supra note 3, at 354 n.55.
147. Cf Goodin, supra note 116, at 445-46 (describing as "simply absurd" the idea
that the "character" factor would even consider the government's purpose).
148. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
149. Gary Lawson and his co-authors argue that the end of the three-part balancing
test is precisely what Lingle achieved, an argument that also includes the assertion that the
Court really did not mean to establish a three-part test at the center of its regulatory
takings doctrine in Penn Central in the first place. See Lawson et al., supra note 108, at 46,
50. Because I do not agree with that assumption-and because in later decisions, including
Lingle, the Court does not seem to have agreed with it either-I do not think that a threepart balancing test with one part and no balance is what the Court intended to leave
standing in Lingle. See generally supra note 108 (explaining my disagreement with Lawson).
150. On the two-step process of regulatory takings review, see text accompanying
supra note 55; Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
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invasion by government."' 5 ' Now remember that at step-one, a
court sorts the plaintiffs takings claim according to the impact of
the regulation: Is it a permanent physical invasion, is it a
diminution of all economic value, or is it merely a partial taking of
a non-fundamental property interest? 52 If a court applies the
limited version as the sole element of the "character" factor at Penn
Centra's step-two, it would utilize the same test that it had already
performed at step-one, when it decided whether the various highscrutiny categories applied.151 If none of those categories apply,
then Penn Central's balancing test does. It is possible that the Court
intended for this factor to consider the proximity of the regulation's
effects to the invasion/total diminution categories-a related but
distinct question from the one applied at step-one. But if that's the
case, then the first problem returns: how is this "factor" distinct
from the others? Furthermore, how can a court balance these
redundant factors, and what is the point of doing so?
Third, as I discussed earlier, the Lucas test, which applies only
in the rare and extreme circumstance where a property is left with
no value following a regulation's application, explicitly allows a
court to consider whether the "character" of the government's
action is similar to that allowed under traditional common law
principles--or, put another way, whether the owner's use of her
property could be abated under private and public nuisance.14 A
strictly limited conception of the "character" factor under Penn
Centralwould not allow this inquiry. But it makes little sense for the
Court to allow an exception for nuisance abatement where the
government's action has the most extreme effect on a property
owner and is the most functionally equivalent to an eminent
domain action, but not allow a similar inquiry when a regulation's
application leaves some value in the property. Indeed, as Christine
Klein has explained, the history of how courts have understood
and utilized an expansive "new nuisance" doctrine in the years
since Lucas demonstrates that a limited vision of the character

151.
152.
153.
154.
nuisance

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See generally text accompanying supra notes 132-136 (discussing Lucas's limited
exception).
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factor not only makes little sense, but is not one that courts have
embraced.

155

There remains the possibility that the Court narrowed the
"character" test implicitly by virtue of banishing the Agins test and
clarifying the logic of its regulatory takings jurisprudence through
a "functional equivalence" test. This possibility assumes that the
only possible meaning for "character" after Lingle, besides as
another means for considering regulatory effect, is as some version
of Lucas's very narrow common law nuisance test, which seems to
be constrained both in concept (only harm-abatement) and time
(only very longstanding, state common law doctrine that
traditionally limited an owner's title).56 But this assertion is not
thoroughly supported by Lingle, which dispensed only with the
"means-ends" test of Agins which "asks, in essence," the Court
wrote, "whether a regulation of private property is effective in
achieving some legitimate public purpose."5 7 Lingle does not
directly address the type and extent of the government's concern
in regulating-the character of the government's intent rather
than the tightness of its means-ends fit. It does, however, quote
Penn Central's dual sense of the "governmental character," which'
allows courts to look both at the regulation's effects on the
plaintiff's property and whether the action serves the broader
",common good.' 1 5 8 The Ninth Circuit was mistaken in its line of
rent control cases that applied the disjunctive Agins test not
because of its willingness to consider the government's regulatory
aim, but because of its decision to apply "heightened scrutiny" to
the state's effort to meet that aim.1 59 The "common good," as Penn
Central had originally explained and as Agins reiterated, is surely

155. See Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and
Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1156-57 (2007).
156. See Barros, supra note 3, at 354 n.54; Goodin, supra note 116, at 454-55. It seems
as though these authors would not limit the nuisance exception to Lucas's common law
limits; Goodin in particular is quite unclear on this point.
157. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 542; see also id. at 543 (noting that "[t]he owner of a property
subject to a regulation that effectively serves a legitimate state interest may be just as singled
out and just as burdened as the owner of a property subject to an ineffective regulation,"
and accordingly is equally due compensation).
158. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S.
106, 124 (1978)).
159. Id. at 545.
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broader than Lucas's extremely constrained understanding of a
nuisance exception.
Accordingly, Lingle did not eliminate or truncate either Penn
Central or the components of its test. Thus, its broad inquiry
remains available to courts. Before discussing the implications of
that insight in Part V, I want to address one possibility for what that
inquiry might entail. John Echeverria and Nestor Davidson have
each separately suggested that the concept of "reciprocity of
advantage,"1" a longstanding, free-floating inquiry that Justice
Holmes first identified in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon as evidence of
a legitimate exercise of the police power, constitutes a legitimate
post-Lingle inquiry into the character of the government's action. 6
If a regulation affects a broad swathe of the population, or if it is
part of a general regulatory program that spreads harms and
benefits so that an owner whose property is adversely affected at
one time will later enjoy limits placed on others' property, then, in
Justice Rehnquist's words from his Penn Central dissent, the
regulation works "not only for the benefit of the municipality as a
whole but also for the common benefit of [all property owners] .,,162
Significantly, the Penn Centralmajority also embraced the concept,
disagreeing with the dissent only regarding whether New York's
historic preservation ordinance provided reciprocal benefits,'63
while the Court explicitly considered the reciprocity of
Pennsylvania's legislation in Keystone Bituminous."6 Although Lingle
did not mention the concept, it declared that the Agins
"substantially burdens test" failed in part because it concerned
neither the magnitude of a regulation's effects nor "how any
regulatory burden is distributed among property owners"-itself
suggesting an equality norm that parallels the reciprocity
concept."

160. See Davidson, supra note 145, at 35-37; Echeverria, supra note 116, at 204-07.
161. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). On the reciprocity concept,
see Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and "Average Reciprocity of Advantage"
Rules in a Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1458-72, 1490-1520 (1997).
162. Penn Central 438 U.S. at 140 (1978) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 132.
164. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987).
165. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005); Davidson, supra note
145, at 35-36.
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The reciprocity concept assumes that the Takings Clause
represents a constitutional commitment to fairness, and that
judicial review will intervene to protect those property owners who
are subject to unjust treatment.1" It enforces the so-called
Armstrong principle, which the Court almost mechanically invokes
when it discusses the regulatory takings doctrine. It holds that the
Takings Clause was "designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'6 v Accordingly,
the reciprocity concept offers two advantages to a post-Lingle
meaning of the "character" factor. One, it furthers the underlying
normative rationale for the doctrine itself. Two, it offers a relatively
clear-cut means for courts to identify instances when a regulation is
illegitimate: when it singles out the property owner for a burden
and will fail to offer her future benefits through its application to
other owners."6
But reciprocity seems an unlikely candidate to serve as the
substantive test for the "character" factor, and would constitute a
difficult foundation for a legal standard. As I have argued
elsewhere, while the Supreme Court ritualistically cites the abstract
ideals of "fairness" and 'justice" as rationales for its regulatory
takings doctrine, it applies them unevenly and imprecisely. 69
Although Keystone Bituminous cites and in part relies on the
concept to justify its result, the Court has never used it as an
outcome-determinative test. Furthermore, reciprocity is a concept
with no means to draw lines, besides the basic distinction between
two stylized archetypes: the broadly applicable, legislativelyimposed regulation, for which reciprocity would presumably be
available, and the individualized, adjudicated decision, for which
reciprocity would presumably be unavailable. Legislated
166. Echeverria, supra note 116, at 204.
167. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
168. This was one of the justifications Justice Scalia cited for imposing higher
scrutiny when an owner loses all economic value in her property. See Lucas v. S. C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992) ("Surely, at least, in the extraordinary
circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is
less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life in a manner that secures an average reciprocity of
advantage to everyone concerned.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
169. See Fenster, supra note 20, at 697-98.
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regulations are frequently characterized as un-reciprocal-the
regulation for which Justice Holmes required compensation in
Mahon, for example, was imposed by state statute, while Justice
Rehnquist argued in his Penn Central dissent that New York's
historic preservation ordinance offered only limited benefits to the
owners of Grand Central Station. Reciprocity is certainly relevant
to regulatory takings. Although Lingle makes plain that an
illegitimate regulation that singles out an individual for harm
sounds in due process rather than the Takings Clause, 7 ' the more
burdensome a regulation and the less likely that a property owner
will receive benefit, the more likely it is that the property owner
should be compensated under Penn Centrals balancing test. But
this suggests that reciprocity plays a role in all of the Penn Central
factors, rather serving as the unique province of the "character"
factor.
V. THE CHARACTER FACTOR, AFTER LINGLE

Lingle left in place the "character of the governmental action"
factor. It reiterated Penn Centrals somewhat confusing dual
definition of "character." It eradicated the Ninth Circuit's
heightened scrutiny of Hawaii's regulation as a substantial due
process test, but it did not explicitly remove from review under the
Takings Clause either the kind of effects the regulation has on the
plaintiff's property or the government's aims in regulating. The
character factor thus allows courts to account for the significance
of the government's regulatory program-for the extent to which
the program advances the "common good," as Penn Central
stated-even if in most cases courts will not need to consider it.
Because Lingle characterized the character factor as a secondary
concern, courts should only make that inquiry in difficult cases,
when the government has attempted to address an exceptionally
important concern and when the consequences of a compensation
award under the Takings Clause for present and future regulatory
interventions into market failures and dangerous externalities are
grave. In this way, the character factor accommodates the state's
need to intervene to protect the public's health, safety, and welfare

170. See Echeverria, supra note 116, at 206.
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from nuisance and nuisance-like threats. Part V attempts first to
illustrate, and then to explain and to an extent justify the Court's
approach as one that makes sense in difficult cases as a means to
allow courts flexibility in performing the Penn Centralbalance fairly
and effectively.
A. Post-Lingle CharacterFactorDecisions
Two courts have faced cases that required them to apply the
Penn Central test thoroughly and carefully, both just before and
soon after the Supreme Court issued Lingle. Their efforts to
articulate and apply a workable concept of governmental character
illustrate why the character factor remains both relevant and
necessary, and they offer models for how courts should perform
the Penn Central balancing test with the government's purpose in
mind.
1. The characterfactor in the Federal Circuit.
The year before the Supreme Court decided Lingle, the Federal
Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction under the Tucker Act to
hear regulatory takings claims for compensation from the United
States,'71 offered an extensive and effective interpretation of Penn
Centrals character factor. In Bass Enterprises v. United States, v2 the
court overruled a set of earlier decisions whose expansive, antiregulatory approach to the regulatory takings doctrine had
suggested that the government must identify the background
principles of common law nuisance-that is, the Lucas nuisance
exception-in order to avoid paying compensation to an affected
property owner.'73 Instead, following the Supreme Court's then

171. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (Westlaw 2009).
172. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For
critical histories of the Federal Circuit's approach to regulatory takings, see Michael C.
Blumm, Twenty Years of Environmental Law: Role Reversals Between Congress and the Executive,
JudicialActivism Underminingthe Environment, and the Proliferationof Environmental(and AntiEnvironmental) Groups, 20 VA. ENVrL. LJ. 5, 10-11 (2001); David F. Coursen, The Takings
Jurisprudenceof the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 828-31
(1999).
173. Bass Enterprises, 381 F.3d at 1369 (recognizing that recent Supreme Court
decisions had rejected the circuit's approach in Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208
F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.
Cir. 1994)).
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most recent takings decisions, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island74 and Tahoe175
Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency,
the court adopted what it characterized as a properly "gestalt"
approach to takings claims under Penn Central that considered,
among other things, the necessity and substantiality of the
government's regulatory purpose. ' Quoting Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Palazzolo, the circuit panel proclaimed that, "' [t]he
purposes served, as well as the effects produced, by a particular
regulation inform the takings analysis."",177 This remains the
circuit's approach to the character factor, even after Lingle. In its
most recent decision in the complex and protracted Cienega
Gardens litigation over federal affordable housing legislation
administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the D.C. Circuit described the Penn Central test as
one that requires a court to perform an extensive balancing of the
"practical realities of the [factual] situation" and to consider,
under the character factor, "the precise action that the
government has taken and the strength of the governmental
interest in taking that action."' Judicial review in the Federal

174. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
175. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
176. Bass Enterprises, 381 F.3d at 1370 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323, and
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). See also Maritrans Inc. v. United
States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that in performing a Penn Central
analysis, a court should "consider the purpose and importance of the public interest
underlying a regulatory imposition").
177. Id. at 1369-70 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
178. Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega X), 503 F.3d 1266, 1279 (D.C. Cir.
2007). This restatement upholds the Court of Claims' discussion of the character factor
which, following Lingle, it described in this way:
Assessing the character of the governmental action requires an analysis both of
the purpose of the statute and of the actions taken by the government to serve
that purpose.... This inquiry concerns not only the societal benefit sought to be
achieved by the governmental action but also whether the burdens imposed by
the action were spread broadly over a large portion of the population or placed
particularly on a relatively few property owners.
Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega IX), 67 Fed. Cl. 434, 466 (2005) (citations
omitted), reu'd on other grounds, Cienega X, 503 F.3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2007). See also Norman
v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (post-LingLeaffirmance of a Court of
Claims decision that considered the legitimacy and applicability of the government's
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Circuit of partial takings under Penn Central, then, is an intensively
fact-specific inquiry that considers as relevant but not dispositive
the regulation's purpose.
Given this general approach, the ongoing Rose Acre Farms v.
United States litigation, which has been bouncing around the
federal courts for decades, demonstrates how courts struggle to
employ the character factor.179 Regulations issued by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) intended to prevent the
spread of salmonella through eggs require testing of a poultry
flock if it is identified as a source of a salmonella outbreak. After a
positive salmonella test, a farm's eggs must be pasteurized and
cannot be sold interstate without special permitting."'°
Government authorities traced three outbreaks of salmonella
poisoning in the Midwest to products sold by Rose Acre Farms, a
major egg producer based in Indiana. In response to the outbreak,
the USDA tested Rose Acre's flocks, appropriated 6741 hens for
testing, and restricted operations at all of Rose Acre's three
farms.' To minimize its losses, Rose Acre built one new plant and
expanded an existing one, diverting almost 60 million eggs to the
less profitable intrastate market.8 2
In October 1992, Rose Acre filed a regulatory takings
complaint seeking over $21 million in damages for the restricted
sales, losses from hens destroyed during testing, reduced
production, cleaning and disinfection costs, and other ancillary
costs. ' 3 Applying the Penn Central balancing test to Rose Acre's
claims that the confiscation of its eggs by the USDA required
compensation, the Court of Federal Claims found that the
government's actions caused the plaintiff to suffer severe, adverse

regulatory action under the character factor).
179. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States (Rose Acre Farms 1), 53 Fed. C1. 504, 506
(2002), superseded by 55 Fed. Cl. 643 (2003) (Rose Acre Farms If), rev'd, 373 F.3d 1177 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (Rose Acre Farms Ill), on remand, No. 92-710C, 2007 WL 5177409 (Fed. CI. July 11,
2007) (Rose Acre Farms IV). In addition, more than a decade earlier Rose Acre Farms had
filed suit in the Seventh Circuit, claiming among other things that the USDA's actions
violated its substantive due process rights. It lost. See Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 956
F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1992).
180. 9 C.F.R §§ 82.30-82.36 (1991).
181. RoseAcre Farms I, 53 Fed. Cl. at 510.
182. Id. at511.
183. Id- at 512.
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financial distress and frustrated its reasonable investment-backed
expectations. 84 The court also found that the government's
regulatory program was "misguided" and "ineffective" because it
failed to test Rose Acre's eggs, and because it could not identify
the source in the majority of the country's salmonella outbreaks
during that same period. Therefore, the court concluded, the
character of the government's action also weighed in Rose Acre's
favor. 15 With all three Penn Central factors favoring the plaintiff,
the court awarded Rose Acre more than $6 million in
the taking of its eggs and hens, plus costs and
compensation for
6
8
1
fees.
attorney's
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the trial court's judgment in 2004, ordering the Court of Claims to
re-analyze the economic impact of the alleged taking and to
reconsider the public benefit and private burdens of the
regulation within the Penn Central framework.'87 Specifically, the
circuit panel held that in awarding compensation to Rose Acre
Farms, the trial court had failed to apply Penn Centrals character
factor correctly and had wrongly performed the Penn Central
balancing test.' With respect to the character factor, the panel
identified two errors that the Court of Claims made. First, the
claims court's assertion that the USDA could have used less
restrictive alternatives in its regulatory program was irrelevant
under the Takings Clause; rather the key issue for the court to
consider was "whether there is a nexus between the regulation and
its underlying public purpose."'8 9 The panel's statement is clearly
wrong after Lingle, which rejected nexus as a test under the
Takings Clause except in a narrowly defined set of cases. 9 But the

184. Id. at 516-18.
185. Id.at 519.
186. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States (Rose Acre Farms I), 55 Fed. Cl. 643, 670
(2003).
187. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States (Rose Acre Farms II1), 373 F.3d 1177 at
1198 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
188. Id. at 1191-95.
189. Id. at 1194 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
190. The nexus test applies only to regulatory takings claims against land use
regulations that impose conditions on a property owner in exchange for the grant of an
entitlement to intensify development; such "exactions" are subject to both a nexus and a
proportionality test, which do not apply outside of the exactions context. See Lingle v.
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claims court's requirement of a less restrictive alternative under
the Takings Clause was also incorrect, while the circuit court's
rejection of that approach-on the grounds that a court reviewing
a regulatory takings claim does not consider a regulatory
program's invalidity or lack of wisdom-is entirely consistent with
Lingle.
Second, Rose Acre Farms had persuaded the claims court that
it had been unfairly targeted by USDA because its eggs, unlike
those of other egg producers, could be traced to salmonella
poisoning, and therefore its business suffered a disproportionate
amount of the burden from the government's regulatory
program. 9 ' The circuit panel was unpersuaded that this
constituted evidence that tilted the Penn Central balance in Rose
Acre's favor. Rather, it held that the government had employed
the best available scientific evidence to respond to a health crisis
caused by unsafe food produced and distributed by one of the
largest egg producers in the United States.' The government's
generally applicable regulation represented an important
intervention by the government under its police power authority.
If the character factor has any meaning at all, the panel suggested,
the claims court was surely wrong in concluding that the USDA's
efforts in this case constituted bad character.
On remand, the Court of Claims again found a taking. It held
fast to its conclusions that Rose Acre suffered exceptionally
adverse, albeit temporary, economic impacts and frustrated
3
expectations from the regulationO
"-conclusions
that the Federal
Circuit had largely supported in Rose Acre III.14 As to the appellate
court's rejection of its application of the character factor, the
Court of Claims suggested that by abrogating the "substantially

Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545-48 (2005) (explaining the narrow circumstances in
which nexus applies); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (imposing
proportionality test on exactions); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (imposing nexus test on
exactions). See generally Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a ConstitutionalShadow: The
InstitutionalContexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729 (2007) (analyzing Lingle's effects on
Nollan and Dolan).
191. Rose Acre Farms , 55 Fed. CI. at 647.
192. Rose Acre FarmslI, 373 F.3d at 1191, 1194.
193. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States (Rose Acre Farms IV), No. 92-710C, 2007
WL 5177409, at *7-8 (Fed. C. July 11, 2007).
194. Rose Acre Farms II, 373 F.3d at 1191.
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advances test" in a takings analysis, the Lingle Court required
courts to focus only on the distribution of the regulation's burden.
As a result, the claims court asserted, the federal circuit had itself
incorrectly focused on the regulation's ends and its means to
achieve, it.19 5 Nevertheless, conceding that the appellate court's
declaration that the character factor favored the government
constituted law of the case, the Court of Claims made no further
effort to press its deep skepticism about the regulation's misguided
and ineffective efforts. 96 This was irrelevant to the judgment,
however, as on the basis of the other Penn Centralfactors the claims
court again found in favor of Rose Acre and awarded over $5
million in damages and over $3 million in fees and expenses. 9 7
As this article went to press, the Federal Circuit again reversed
the Court of Claims, this time by affirmatively holding that the
government's regulatory efforts did not effect a taking."' Although
it agreed with the claims court that Lingle has "changed the
landscape" in regulatory takings law, the circuit panel concluded
that the Supreme Court had neither excised the character factor
from the Penn Centraltest nor fully eviscerated it.199 The panel then
used two distinct means of applying the factor. First, it recognized
the severe burden that Rose Acre suffered as a result of the
regulations, but held that the egg producer had failed to
demonstrate that the government had singled out its operations.
To the extent that Rose Acre claimed the regulations were
insufficiently broad to be effective, its argument sought to
challenge the regulations' wisdom and effectiveness-a challenge
that Lingle barred from a takings analysis."' 0 Second, and more
significantly, the court also considered the government's
regulatory rationale. Because the regulations attempted to protect
the public's health and safety against a known, proven threat, they
deserved greater deference in a takings analysis than those
"intended to modify the distribution of wealth," like Hawaii's

195.
196.
197.
198.
Cir. Mar.
199.
200.

Rose Acre Farms IV, 2007 WL 5177409, at *8.
Id.
Id. at*13.
Rose Acre Farms v. United States (Rose Acre Farms /), 2009 WL 615449, (D.C.
12, 2009).
Id. at*15.
Id. at*17-18:
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economic regulations that Chevron had challenged in Lingle.2 °1
Reviewing the long history of legislative efforts to regulate food
safety that sought to provide stronger, systematic protections than
common law protections available via tort and contract liability,
the court held that government efforts to protect public health
and safety are "the type of regulation in which the private interest
has traditionally been most confined and governments are given
the greatest leeway to act without the need to compensate those
affected by their actions. 1, 2 The court characterized this judicial
deference to the government as one that courts apply on an
individualized basis in light of the threat the government is
addressing, rather than as a per se rule that immunizes the
government from liability for all health and safety regulations. °3 In
this instance, the government's actions were necessary to curb an
existing threat and thus weighed strongly in the government's
favor under a Penn Central analysis-leading, ultimately, to the
court's decision to find that the Penn Central balance weighed in
favor of the government.2 4 Consistent with both the spirit and
letter of Penn Central's deferential, ad hoc balancing test, the
Federal Circuit has articulated a flexible, pragmatic approach to
the character test, one that weighs heavily only in particular
circumstances, when the government's actions are most necessary.
2. Georgia and the Mann decisions.
In a series of decisions challenging the effects of residency
restrictions on registered sex offenders, the Georgia Supreme
Court has also considered the important character of the
government's actions in deciding to require compensation.0 5
Anthony Mann's status as a registered sex offender in Georgia
subjected him to state statutory restrictions that required him to
live and work more than one thousand feet away from any
childcare facility, church, school, or area where minors congregate

201. Id. at*18.
202. Id. at *20.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *21-22.
205. Mann v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections (Mann I), 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007);
Mann v. State (Mann 1), 603 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. 2004).
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or face felony prosecution. 16 The Georgia Supreme Court in 2004
had rejected Mann's earlier takings challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute, when he was forced to vacate his
parents' home where he had been living rent-free. °7 In Mann I, the
court had characterized the plaintiff's interest in his residence as
minimal. Mann had no investment-backed expectations in
retaining whatever small property interest he had in his agreement
with his parents that he could remain so long as he performed
work around the house and shared living expenses. 2" During the
years between his first and second challenge to the statute, Mann
had purchased a home with his wife and obtained half-ownership
of a barbecue restaurant; neither the home or the business, at the
time of purchase, was within one thousand feet of any facility
covered by the sex offender statute. After childcare facilities
located themselves within the prohibited proximity of both his
residence and his restaurant, Mann was required by his probation
officer to move from his home and quit the premises of his
business.
In Mann II, the Georgia Supreme Court awarded Mann
compensation under the Takings Clause for the effects of the
regulation on his residence, but not for those on his business.
Applying the Penn Centralfactors, the court distinguished between
the "significant" interest Mann had accrued in the house he
purchased and shared with his wife, which the statute forced him
to sell, °0 with the business that he co-owned, over which he could
retain ownership even if he could no longer work or visit there.1 0
Applying Lingle, the court concluded that forcing Mann to vacate
his home constituted the functional equivalent of an immediate
ouster. Furthermore, even if he and his wife retained ownership in
the house, he would be unable to return for at least the ten years
of his probation and would face the financial burden of procuring
and maintaining another residence.2"1 ' The statute requires a

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-1-15 (Westlaw 2009).
Mann I, 603 S.E.2d at 443-44.
Id. at 285.
Mann II, 653 S.E.2d at 743.
Idat 746.
Id. at 743.
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registered offender to live in a constant state of uncertainty that a
new entrant to the neighborhood might force him to sell his
home. Any facility protected from nearby registered sex offenders,
by contrast, could take advantage of the notice the state provides
212
of an offender's residence and choose a location accordingly.
The combination of the plaintiffs loss of his home and the
economic impact from a forced sale-which the court assumes
would exist but never even attempts to support-outweighs the
government's interest in its residency requirement." 3
The government's interest in the residency statute was not
insignificant, however, and, like the Federal Circuit, the Georgia
Supreme Court was willing to consider that interest as an
important, but not dispositive, part of its Penn Centralanalysis.1 4 In
Mann I, the court had characterized the government's interest in
protecting against allowing "those offenders inclined toward
recidivism to have contact with, and possibly victimize, the
2 1 Mann II
youngest members of society" as quite "considerable.""

212. Id. at 74245.
213. Id. at 745. The court never explained why Mann could not get full value for his
home, or why he would not be able to purchase another -house for market value. To be
sure, as the court asserts, he would be forced to pay the transaction costs of broker
commissions, closing costs, and moving expenses, see id at 744, but those dead-weight losses
would surely not have approached the degree of economic impact presumptively required
under Penn Central. The court also emphasizes that the statute "effectively places the
State's police power into the hands of private third parties" by enabling facility-owners to
force the ouster of a registered sex offender by locating their operations near his home. Id.
at 745. Of course this is no different from any public nuisance action in which new
residents moved near an existing use, which is generally not deemed a nuisance. See, e.g.,
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (explaining that there was no takings liability
for government regulation that forbade the operation of a brickyard within defined areas
of a city). Nor does it explain why the results differ when the facility owner moves near a
house that a registered offender owns, as opposed either to a house that he rents or a
business that he owns or that employs him.
214. I am making no assertions regarding other constitutional claims that Mann
might have against Georgia's residency restrictions, nor am I suggesting that I consider
these restrictions to be either effective in protecting children or politically or morally
defensible. In this Article, I am concerned only with the government's interest in
protecting children, and how that interest should be considered in the adjudication of a
challenge under the Takings Clause to a law that seeks to advance that purpose. For a
more normative and evaluative discussion of these laws, see Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional
Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2006); Corey
Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 101 (2007); Bret R. Hobson, Note, BanishingActs: How FarMay States Go
to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders Away from Children? 40 GA. L. REV. 961 (2006).
215. Mann v. Georgia Dept. of Correction (Mann 1), 603 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Ga. 2004).
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did not stray from that determination, and the court refused to
award compensation for the burden on Mann's interest in the
business he co-owned. He could continue to own the barbecue
restaurant notwithstanding his inability to work there or visit it,
and he failed to show that the restriction would cause significant
economic damage to the business.2 16
Although the court in Mann II continued to acknowledge the
state's interest in protecting children, it also appeared uncertain as
to how or whether it should defer to that interest in evaluating
Mann's takings claim. It had decided Mann I before Lingle, and in
2004 read the Penn Central test as requiring it to consider the
state's interest as part of the "character" test. Applying the multifactor balancing test, the court in Mann Iwrote:
In contrast to [Mann's] slight [interests in his residence at his
parents' home], the State's interests underlying the Residency
Statute are considerable. . . . While not every convicted sex
offender will be a recidivist, the statute aims to lessen the
potential for those offenders inclined toward recidivism to have
contact with, and possibly victimize, the youngest members of
society. As such, the State's interests underlying the Residency
Statute are entitled to substantial weight. 17
Three years later, the court was far more hesitant to weight the
state's interest so strongly: "However, even assuming, arguendo,
that the substantiality of the public purpose advanced by a
regulation is still pertinent to a takings challenge, but see Lingle, we
cannot overlook the significant adverse economic impact of [the
2 1 Ruling
restriction] on appellant.""
in favor of the state on Mann's
claim that his business had also been taken as a result of the
residency statute, the court ultimately did not ignore the state's
interest.
The two decisions in Mann demonstrate that Lingle has curbed,
but not banished, consideration of the government's purpose in a
Penn Central analysis. Before Lingle, the court in Mann I
216. Mann l, 653 S.E.2d at 746.
217. Mann 1,603 S.E.2d at 286.
218. Mann II, 653 S.E.2d at 745. See also id. at 745 n.7 (summarizing Lingle's
command that courts reviewing takings claims focus on the regulation's effects on
property owners).
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unabashedly explored the significance of the governmental
interest as a factor in its ad hoc balancing. After Lingle, the court
appeared more hesitant to emphasize the state's purpose, even
suggesting (incorrectly, as I have argued) that it might be barred
from doing so. It is unclear whether this shift caused the different
outcomes between the two decisions. Mann's forced vacation of his
co-owned house unquestionably gave him a stronger claim in the
second case. So did the fact that he was forced to move from his
parents' home because of the statute's enactment, while in Mann II
the unanticipated entrance of a new home into his immediate
neighborhood one year after he purchiased his own home forced
him to move." l9 Mann II appeared to eschew explicit and
substantial consideration of the state's purpose, but it did not seem
to ignore it entirely. This is the correct response to Lingle, and a
model for future courts that are forced to consider a Penn Central
claim in which the government's interest appears especially strong,
such as emergency health and safety regulations (as in Rose Acre
Farms) and efforts to protect vulnerable populations from
potentially predatory recidivists (as in the Mann cases).
B. The CharacterFactorAfter Lingle
The character factor thus gives courts the discretion to
consider the significance of the government's regulatory purpose
in cases in which that purpose might justify exceptional economic
harm to the property owner. This is consistent with, although not
identical to, the longstanding doctrine that exempts nuisance
abatement from takings liability."' In the cases described above,
courts did not assume that the government's attempts to control
the threats caused by poisoned eggs and registered sex offenders
immunized their regulatory actions from takings liability. Instead,
they weighed the government's purpose as one factor in their

219. See Mann I, 603 S.E.2d at 442; Mann II, 653 S.E.2d at 742.
220. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 106, 14446 & n.8
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (identifying a "nuisance exception to the taking
guarantee"); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (finding no taking where city
prohibited a nuisance-creating brickyard within a district); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887) (finding no taking of a brewery forced to shut down when the state enacted a
prohibition against the manufacture of alcohol on the grounds that the brewery
constituted a public nuisance).
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analysis. Nor did the courts require the challenged state actions to
constitute nuisance abatement in the traditional common law
sense that Lucas requires. 22' Following Penn Central, which holds
that the government's purpose can extend to spreading the
benefits of historic preservation and to modern conceptions of
harm, 2 these cases suggest that courts can defer to governmental
efforts to control a dangerous harm, and weigh those efforts in the
Penn Centralbalance.
This is not new. Throughout the twentieth century, regulatory
efforts to address exceptional crises like national emergencies and
domestic shortages during wartime have survived takings
challenges. 223 But it does undercut Lingle's apparent promise to
deliver internal coherence and conceptual purity to what has long
been viewed as a doctrinal and conceptual muddle through a focus
on the functional equivalence of a regulation's impact to a physical
taking. 224 The character factor does not eliminate the emphasis
Lingle places on a regulation's effects, but it does allow
governments to show and courts to consider regulatory purpose.
The character factor's superficial inconsistency with Lingle's
holding obscures a deeper consistency between the character
factor and the Court's comprehensive institutional approach to

221. See generally text accompanying supra notes 132-136 (discussing Lucas's limited
nuisance exception). Indeed, besides the Federal Circuit, which has since corrected itself,
courts have rarely required common law nuisance abatement outside of the Lucas context.
See Stewart Sterk, The Inevitable Failure of Nuisance-Based Theories of the Takings Clause: A Reply
to Professor Claeys, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 231, 232 (2004).
222. See Klein, supra note 155. This was true even in the traditional common law
context, as Louise Halper demonstrated in her response to Justice Scalia's effort in Lucas
to limit nuisance as a governmental defense in total takings cases. See Louise A. Halper,
Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REv. 329 (1995).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)
(upholding against a takings challenge a temporary shutdown of gold mining operations
because "[w]ar... demands the strict regulation of nearly all resources."); Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135, 157 (1920) (upholding against a takings challenge a temporary rent control
ordinance instituted during wartime).
224. Property rights advocates who hope to invigorate the substantive due process
and regulatory takings doctrines have argued that Lingle failed to resolve either doctrine,
in large part because of the Court's commitment to fairness in its regulatory takings
decisions. See Eagle, supra note 12, at 922 (arguing that the Armstrong principle lends itself
to a substantive due process analysis); Radford, supra note 11, at 445, 449-50 (arguing that
fairness and reciprocity concerns allow the Agins test to remain relevant to regulatory
takings, and suggests that the Court will inevitably overrule Lingle).
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the Takings Clause. A broad understanding of "character" allows
courts to balance the judicial protection of constitutional property
rights-enabling courts to intervene in cases in which the impact
on property values and reasonable investment-backed expectations
is great-against judicial deference to the regulatory interventions
of the state. Courts may require compensation in those instances
when a regulation's effects are greatest while they remain
respectful of the roles that federal, state, and local governments
play in a modern, complex economy and society. The Court's
embrace of Penn Central, in a unanimous decision written by the
moderate conservative Justice O'Connor, rather than one of the
more vocal advocates of constitutional property rights like Chief
Justice Rehnquist or Justice Scalia, has ended the grand historical
moment of the Takings Clause that had delivered the high drama
of Lucas and other decisions suggesting that a rollback of the
regulatory state was imminent. Instead, the Court has chosen to
preserve its political capital through small-step decisions that
narrowly review regulatory actions, in the process balancing all of
the relevant interests and respecting all of the relevant institutions
involved.2 6 By allowing courts the discretion to consider the
government's regulatory purpose, the character factor serves a key
role in the Court's canonization of Penn Centraland in the broader
modern commitment to the regulatory state.
In
addition
to undermining
the unified
"takings
jurisprudence" that the Court claimed to have achieved, the
character factor also undercuts the small corrective Lingle might
have offered to the indeterminacy of the regulatory takings
doctrine. If the doctrine focused exclusively on regulatory effects,
then courts might have been able to develop some rules or clear
standard with which to adjudicate disputes-perhaps a certain

225. I develop this argument more thoroughly in Fenster, supra note 20, at 733-39.
226. This characteristic of Lingle is consistent with its author's preference for
incremental decisions rather than major, grand statements of law. See Michael B.
Rappaport, It's the O'Connor Court: A Brief Discussion of Some Critiques of the Rehnquist Court
and Their Implications for Administrative Law, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 369, 377-78 (2004)
(characterizing the decisions of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy as appearing "especially
concerned with protecting the Court's political capital"); Kent D. Sevyrud, Lessons ftom
Working for Sandra Day O'Connor, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (2006) (describing
O'Connor's resistance to grand statements as a means to protect the Court from "deeply
uncivil and ideologically polarized politics in every branch of government").
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percent diminution in value would guarantee or at least make
more likely a compensation award, for example. 2 7 If courts
consider regulatory purpose as well as regulatory effects, however,
they will engage in more case-by-case adjudication of takings
claims, because even when the impacts are significant, the
government can still identify the exceptional harm that would
occur but for its necessary regulatory program. Once again,
however, such fact-specific judicial inquiries are quite consistent
with the late Rehnquist Court's approach to regulatory takings,
which before Lingle had already embraced Penn Centra's
indeterminate balancing test as the "polestar" of its regulatory
takings jurisprudence.2 "' The application of open-ended standards
and balancing tests that the Penn Central test allows is entirely
consistent with Justice O'Connor's jurisprudential approach to
difficult constitutional issues, which preferred standards and
balancing tests to clear, mechanical rules. 9 Indeed, this
227. On the desire for clear rules in takings doctrine, see Mark Fenster, Takings
Formalism and Regulatory Formulas:Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV.
609, 619-21 (2004).
228. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Our polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn Centralitself..
. ."); see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
326 n.23 (2002) (quoting "polestar" statement from Palazzolo concurrence); cf. Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (characterizing the Penn Central factors as "the
principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within the
physical takings or Lucas rules").
229. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (declaring, in a case in which free speech and
establishment claims were in conflict, that "[w] hen bedrock principles collide, they test the
limits of categorical obstinacy and expose the flaws and dangers of a Grand Unified
Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor unified"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 629 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (conceding that the test that she developed under the
Establishment Clause for religious displays "depends on a sensitivity to the unique
circumstances and context of a particular challenged practice and, like any test that is
sensitive to context, it may not always yield results with unanimous agreement at the
margins," while arguing that such "is true of many standards in constitutional law"); see
generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. RENT. 22, 11521 (1992) (grouping Justice O'Connor with other justices as ascribing to the belief in "the
rule of law as the law of standards"). Sullivan's account is largely descriptive; for academic
evaluations of this characteristic, see, for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism
Decisions ofJustices Rehnquist and O'Connor: Is Half a Loaf Enough , 58 STAN. L. REX'. 1793,
1797-98 (mixing criticism and praise for O'Connor's incremental and centrist embrace of
balancing tests in her federalism decisions); Eric J. Segall, Justice O'Connor and the Rule of
Law, 17 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 108 (2006) (criticizing justice O'Connor for "[h]er
reluctance to articulate principles governing cases, as well as her inconsistent treatment of
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evolutionary path back to individualized adjudication within the
framework of an indeterminate balancing test is both logical and
preferable for the regulatory takings doctrine. Formally precise
constitutional rules articulated by courts under the open-ended
language of the Takings Clause provide neither the stability nor
the efficiencies their advocates claim.2 ° When faced with complex,
heavily contested political and environmental issues, localized,
individualized, and negotiated dispute mechanisms are more likely
to achieve acceptable results than rules produced by nine lifetenured justices.2 31
Ultimately, the character factor serves as a judicial escape
hatch. In its absence, a court that might otherwise be forced to
find another means not to award compensation-for instance, in a
Rose Acre-type case where a government agency is attempting to
respond to a significant health concern-can at least state
explicitly its reason for denying a takings claim. One of legal
realism's most important lessons is that judges respond, above all,
to fact situations. A properly functionalist judge should assess the
conflicting human values at stake in the litigation, appraise the
social importance of existing precedent, consider all of the
relevant evidence that would bring light to the conflict, and reject
the use of abstract legal concepts that would direct the decision
away from the particular dispute and the prevalent norms of social
and commercial behavior in the relevant field.232 In adjudicating
takings disputes, a defendant government agency will inevitably
attempt to persuade the trier of fact of the great significance and
necessity of its challenged regulation. To the extent that the
character factor allows a judge to make this consideration explicit,
legal doctrine, [which] failed to provide enough stability, predictability, or transparency to
differentiate legal rules from personal preferences"); Sevyrud, supra note 226, at 1731-32
(praising the narrowness of O'Connor's decisions and her resistance to grand theories and
bold statements).
230. Articles advocating formal takings rules include Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim
Rossi, DisentanglingDeregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1449 (2000); and Thomas
Ross, Modeling and Formalism in TakingsJurisprudence,61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 372, 416-17
(1986).
231. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 227, at 668-78.
232. See Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 842 (1935); Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 75
(1928). See generally BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE 21-24, 72-73 (2007)
(identifying what he terms the Realists' "Core Claim").
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it will enable her to more candidly decide the issue-a better
alternative than a judge's effort to surreptitiously manipulate facts
in order to reach a result that she thinks will better achieve a
preferred normative or policy end.233
VI. CONCLUSION

Lingle clarified the regulatory takings inquiry and disentangled
the most obvious confusion between the Takings Clause and
substantive due process. It failed to present a fully unified
doctrine, however, as it reconstructed the doctrine at the close of
the takings revolution on the chaotic foundation of Penn Central,
with its indeterminate, inclusive balancing test. For those who long
for coherence and unification, this appears to be a mistake or a
failure of will. But if regulatory takings is viewed instead as a postrealist and post-New Deal compromise between the judicial
protection of property rights and judicial deference to the
administrative state, then the doctrine's stubborn incoherencethe morass that fails to satisfy those who long for a purer
constitutional order that rests on strong property rights
protections-appears understandable and perhaps inevitable.

233. On the value of promoting judicial candor, see PeterJ. Smith, New Legal Fictions,
95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1482-83 (2007); David L. Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicial Candor,100 HARV.
L. REV. 731, 737 (1987).

